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Abstract
We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider
controls a large database that contains information about the match value between
individual consumers and individual …rms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor
their spending to the individual match value. The data provider prices queries about
individual consumers’ characteristics (cookies). We determine the equilibrium data
acquisition and pricing policies. Advertisers choose positive and/or negative targeting policies. The optimal query price in‡uences the composition of the targeted set.
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The use of individual-level information is rapidly increasing in many economic and political environments, ranging from advertising (various forms of targeting) to electoral campaigns (identifying voters who are likely to switch or to turn out). In all these environments,
the socially e¢ cient match between individual and “treatment” may require the collection,
analysis and di¤usion of highly personalized data. A large number of important policy and
regulatory questions are beginning to emerge around the use of personal information. To
properly frame these questions, we must understand how markets for personalized information impact the creation of surplus, which is the main objective of this paper.
Much of the relevant data is collected and distributed by data brokers and data intermediaries ranging from established companies such as Acxiom and Bloomberg, to more recently
established companies such as Bluekai and eXelate. Perhaps the most prevalent technology
to enable the collection and resale of individual-level information is based on cookies and
related means of recording browsing data. Cookies are small …les placed by a website in a
user’s web browser that record information about the user’s visit. Data providers use several
partner websites to place cookies on user’s computers and collect information. In particular, the …rst time any user visits a partner site (e.g., a travel site), a cookie is sent to her
browser, recording any action taken on the site during that browsing session (e.g., searches
for ‡ights).1 If the same user visits another partner website (e.g., an online retailer), the
information contained in her cookie is updated to re‡ect the most recent browsing history.
The data provider therefore maintains a detailed and up-to-date pro…le for each user, and
compiles segments of consumer characteristics, based on each individual’s browsing behavior.
The demand for such highly detailed, consumer-level information is almost entirely driven
by advertisers, who wish to tailor their spending and their campaigns to the characteristics
of each consumer, patient, or voter.
The two distinguishing features of online markets for data are the following: (a) individual
queries (as opposed to access to an entire database) are the actual products for sale,2 and
(b) linear pricing is predominantly used. In other words, advertisers specify which consumer
segments and how many total users (“uniques”) they wish to acquire, and pay a price
proportional to the number of users.3 These features are prominent in the market for cookies,
1

This type of cookie is known as third-party cookie, because the domain installing it is di¤erent from the
website actually visited by the user. Over half of the sites examined in a study by the Wall Street Journal
installed 23 or more third-party cookies on visiting users’ computers (The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your
Secrets, the Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010).
2
We formally de…ne a database and a query in the context of our model in Subsection I.B.
3
Information based on third-party cookies can be priced in two ways: per stamp (CPS), where buyers
pay for the right to access information about an individual user, independent of the frequency of use of that
data; and per mille (CPM), where the price of the information is proportional to the number of advertising
impressions shown using that data. Most data providers give buyers a choice of the pricing criterion.
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but are equally representative of many online and o- ine markets for personal information.
In all these markets, a general picture emerges where an advertiser acquires very detailed
information about a segment of “targeted” consumers, and is rather uninformed about a
larger “residual”set. This kind of information structure, together with the new advertising
opportunities, poses a number of economic questions. How is the advertisers’willingness to
pay for information determined? Which consumers should they target? How should a data
provider price its third-party data? How does the structure of the market for data (e.g.,
competition among sellers, data exclusivity) a¤ect the equilibrium price of information?
More speci…cally to online advertising markets, what are the implications of data sales for
the revenues of large publishers of advertising space?
In this paper, we explore the role of data providers on the price and allocation of
consumer-level information. We provide a framework that addresses general questions about
the market for data and contributes to our understanding of recent practices in online advertising. We develop a simple model of data pricing that captures the key trade-o¤s involved
in selling the information encoded in third-party cookies. However, our model also applies
more broadly to markets for consumer-level information, and it is suited to analyze several
o- ine channels as well.
The model considers heterogeneous consumers and …rms. The (potential) surplus is given
by a function that assigns a value to each realized match between a consumer and a …rm (the
match value function). The match values di¤er along a purely horizontal dimension, and
may represent a market with di¤erentiated products. In order to realize the potential match
value, each …rm must “invest”in contacting consumers. An immediate interpretation of the
investment decision is advertising spending that generates contacts and eventually sales. We
refer to the “advertising technology”as the rate at which investment into contacts generates
actual sales, and to a “cookie”as the information required to tailor advertising spending to
speci…c consumers.
We maintain the two distinguishing features of selling cookies (individual queries and peruser “bit”pricing) as the main assumptions. These assumptions can be stated more precisely
as follows: (a) Individual queries are for sale. We allow advertisers to purchase information
on individual consumers. This enables advertisers to segment users into a targeted group
that receives personalized levels of advertising, and a residual group that receives a uniform
level of advertising (possibly zero). More formally, this means the information structures
available to an advertiser are given by speci…c partitions of the space of match values. (b)
Individual queries are priced separately. We restrict the data provider to set a uniform unit
price, so that the payment to the data provider is proportional to the number of users
(“cookies”) acquired.
3

There exist, of course, other ways to sell information, though linear pricing of cookies is
a natural starting point. We address these variations in extensions of our baseline model. In
particular, we explore alternative mechanisms for selling information, such as bundling and
nonlinear pricing of data.
In Section II, we characterize the advertisers’demand for information for a given price of
data. We establish that advertisers purchase information on two convex sets of consumers,
speci…cally those with the highest and lowest match values. Advertisers do not buy information about every consumer. Instead, they estimate the match value within the residual group
of consumers, and they exclude a convex set in order to minimize the prediction error. Under further conditions, the data-buying policy takes the form of a single cuto¤ match value.
However, advertisers may buy information about all users above the cuto¤ value (positive
targeting) or below the cuto¤ value (negative targeting). Each of these data-buying policies alleviates one potential source of advertising mismatch: wasteful spending on low-value
matches, and insu¢ cient intensity on high-value matches. The optimality of positive vs.
negative targeting depends on the advertising technology and on the distribution of match
values, i.e., on properties of the complete information pro…t function alone.
The advertising technology and the distribution of match values have implications for
the cross-price externalities between the markets for data and advertising. In particular, a
consistent pattern emerges linking the advertisers’preferences for positive vs. negative targeting and the degree to which a publisher of advertising space bene…ts from the availability
of consumer-level data.
In Section III, we turn to the data provider’s pricing problem. We …rst examine the subtle
relationship between the price of cookies and the cost of advertising. The cost of advertising
reduces both the payo¤ advertisers can obtain through better information, and their payo¤
if uninformed. The overall e¤ect on the demand for cookies and on the monopoly price is,
in general, non-monotone. In a leading example, we establish that the price for cookies is
single-peaked in the cost of advertising. This suggests which advertising market conditions
may be more conducive for the data provider.
We then examine the role of market structure on the price of cookies. Surprisingly,
concentrating data sales in the hands of a single data provider is not necessarily detrimental
to social welfare. Formally, we consider a continuum of information providers, each one
selling one signal exclusively. We …nd that prices are higher under data-sales fragmentation.
The reason for this result is that exclusive sellers ignore the negative externality that raising
the price of information about one consumer imposes on the demand for information about all
other consumers. A similar mechanism characterizes the e¤ects of an incomplete database,
sold by a single …rm. In that case, the willingness to pay for information increases with the
4

size of the database, but the monopoly price may, in fact, decrease. This is contrast with
the e¤ect of a more accurate database.
In Section IV, we enrich the set of pricing mechanisms available to the data provider.
In particular, in a binary-action model, we introduce nonlinear pricing of information structures. We show that the data provider can screen vertically heterogeneous advertisers by
o¤ering subsets of the database at a decreasing marginal price. The optimal nonlinear price
determines exclusivity restrictions on a set of “marginal”cookies: in particular, second-best
distortions imply that some cookies that would be pro…table for many advertisers are bought
by only by a small subset of high-value advertisers.
The issue of optimally pricing information in a monopoly and in a competitive market
has been addressed in the …nance literature, starting with seminal contributions by Admati
and P‡eiderer (1986), Admati and P‡eiderer (1990) and Allen (1990), and more recently by
García and Sangiorgi (2011). A di¤erent strand of the literature has examined the sale of information to competing parties. In particular, Sarvary and Parker (1997) model informationsharing among competing consulting companies; Xiang and Sarvary (2013) study the interaction among providers of information to competing clients; Iyer and Soberman (2000)
analyze the sale of heterogeneous signals, corresponding to valuable product modi…cations,
to …rms competing in a di¤erentiated-products duopoly; Taylor (2004) studies the sale of
consumer lists that facilitate price discrimination based on purchase history; Calzolari and
Pavan (2006) consider an agent who contracts sequentially with two principals, and allow
the former to sell information to the latter about her relationship (contract o¤ered, decision taken) with the agent. All of these earlier papers only allow for the complete sale of
information. In other words, they focus on signals that revealed (noisy) information about
all realizations of a payo¤-relevant random variable. The main di¤erence with our paper’s
approach is that we focus on “bit-pricing”of information, by allowing a seller to price each
realization of a random variable separately.
The literature on the optimal choice of information structures is rather recent. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) consider the design of optimal information structures within
the context of an optimal auction. There, the principal controls the design of both the information and the allocation rule. More recently, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider the
design of the information structure by the principal when the agent will take an independent
action on the basis of the received information. In contrast to the persuasion literature,
we endogenize the agent’s information cost by explicitly analyzing the monopoly pricing of
information rather than directly choosing an information structure.
In related contributions, Anton and Yao (2002), Hörner and Skrzypacz (2012), and
Babaio¤, Kleinberg and Paes Leme (2012) derive the optimal mechanism for selling in5

formation about a payo¤-relevant state, in a principal-agent framework. Anton and Yao
(2002) emphasize the role of partial disclosure; Hörner and Skrzypacz (2012) focus on the
incentives to acquire information; and Babaio¤, Kleinberg and Paes Leme (2012) allow both
the seller and the buyer to observe private signals. Finally, Ho¤mann, Inderst and Ottaviani (2014) consider targeted advertising as selective disclosure of product information to
consumers with limited attention spans.
The role of speci…c information structures in auctions, and their implication for online
advertising market design, are analyzed in recent work by Abraham et al. (2014), Celis
et al. (2014), and Syrgkanis, Kempe and Tardos (2013). All three papers are motivated by
asymmetries in bidders’ ability to access additional information about the object for sale.
Ghosh et al. (2012) study the revenue implications of cookie-matching from the point of
view of an informed seller of advertising space, uncovering a trade-o¤ between targeting
and information leakage. In earlier work, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), we analyzed the
impact that changes in the information structures, in particular the targeting ability, have
on the competition for advertising space.

I

Model

A

Consumers, Advertisers, and Matching

We consider a unit mass of uniformly distributed consumers (or “users”), i 2 [0; 1], and advertisers (or “…rms”), j 2 [0; 1]. Each consumer-advertiser pair (i; j) generates a (potential)
match value for the advertiser j:
v : [0; 1]

[0; 1] ! V;

(1)

with v (i; j) 2 V = [v; v] R+ .
Advertiser j must take an action qij 0 directed at consumer i to realize the potential
match value v (i; j). We refer to q as the match intensity. We abstract from the details
of the revenue-generating process associated to matching with intensity q. The completeinformation pro…ts of a …rm generating a match of intensity q with a consumer of value v
are given by
(v; q) , vq c m (q) :
(2)
The matching cost function m : R+ ! R+ is assumed to be increasing, continuously differentiable, and convex. In the context of advertising, q corresponds to the probability of
generating consumer i’s awareness about …rm j’s product. Awareness q is generated by buy6

ing an amount of advertising space m (q), which we assume can be purchased at a unit price
c > 0. If consumer i is made aware of the product, he generates a net present value to the
…rm equal to v (i; j).

B

Data Provider

Initially, the advertisers do not have information about the pair-speci…c match values v (i; j)
beyond the common prior distribution described below. By contrast, the monopolistic data
provider has information relating each consumer to a set of characteristics represented by
the index i, and each advertiser to a set of characteristics represented by the index j. The
database of the data provider is simply the mapping (1) relating the characteristics (i; j) to a
value of the match v (i; j), essentially a large matrix with a continuum of rows (representing
consumers) and columns (representing …rms).
Advertisers can request information from the data provider about consumers with speci…c
characteristics i. Now, from the perspective of advertiser j the only relevant aspect of the
consumer’s characteristic i is the match value v (i; j). Thus, we refer to cookie v as the
information necessary for advertiser j to identify all consumers with a realized match value
v = v (i; j). Similarly, we refer to query v as the request by advertiser j to identify all
consumers in the database with characteristics i such that v = v (i; j).4
Advertisers purchase information from the data provider in order to target their spending.
For example, if advertiser j wishes to tailor his action q to all consumers with value v, then
he queries for the identity of all consumers with characteristics i such that v = v (i; j). More
generally, each advertiser j can purchase information about any subset of consumers with
match values v 2 Aj V . Thus, if advertiser j makes a query v (i.e., purchases the cookie
v), then the value v = v (i; j) belongs to the set Aj , and the advertiser can target consumers
with value v with a tailored level of match intensity. For this reason, we refer to the sets Aj
and ACj as the targeted set and the residual set (or complementary set), respectively.
We assume that the data about individual consumer is sold at a constant linear price p
per cookie.5
4

A query v to the database thus requests the information contained in the cookie v, and in this sense we
can use cookie and query as synonyms. To be precise, the cookie is the information technology that allows
the database to record the characteristics of consumer i and the query retrieves the information from the
database.
5
This assumption re‡ects the pricing of data “per unique user”(also known as “cost per stamp”). It also
matches the o- ine markets for data, where the price of mailing lists, or lists of credit scores is related to the
number of user records.
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C

Distribution of Match Values

The (uniform) distribution over the consumer-…rm pairs (i; j) generates a distribution of
values through the match value function (1). For every measurable subset A of values in V ,
the resulting measure is given by:
(A) ,

Z

didj.

fi;j2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

Let the interval of values beginning with the lowest value be Av , [v; v]. The associated
distribution function F : V ! [0; 1] is de…ned by
F (v) ,

(Av ) .

By extension, we de…ne the conditional measure for every consumer i and every …rm j by
i

(A) ,

Z

dj, and

fj2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

j

(A) ,

Z

di,

fi2[0;1]jv(i;j)2A g

and the associated conditional distribution functions Fi (v) and Fj (v). We assume that the
resulting match values are identically distributed across consumer and across …rms, i.e., for
all i, j, and v:
Fi (v) = Fj (v) = F (v) .
Thus, F (v) represents the common prior distribution for each …rm and each consumer about
the match values. Thus the price of the targeted set Aj is given by
p (Aj ) , p

(Aj ) .

(3)

Prominent examples of distributions that satisfy our symmetry assumption include: i.i.d.
match values across consumer-…rm pairs; and uniformly distributed …rms and consumers
around a unit-length circle, where match values are a function of the distance ji jj. In
other words, match values di¤er along a purely horizontal dimension. This assumption
captures the idea that, even within an industry, the same consumer pro…le can represent a
high match value to some …rms and a low match value to others …rms. This is clearly true
for consumers that di¤er in their geographical location, but applies more broadly as well.6
6

Consider the case of credit-score data: major credit card companies are interested in reaching consumers
with high credit-worthiness; banks that advertise consumer credit lines would like to target individuals with
average scores, who are cash-constraint, but unlikely to default; and subprime lenders such as used car
dealers typically cater to individuals with low or non-existing credit scores, see Adams, Einav and Levin
(2009) for a description and model of subprime lending.
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Figure 1 summarizes the timing of our model.
Figure 1: Timing

We note that the present model does not explicitly describe the consumer’s problem
and the resulting indirect utility. To the extent that information facilitates the creation of
valuable matches between consumers and advertisers, as a …rst approximation, the indirect
utility of the consumer may be thought of as co-monotone with the realized match value v.
In fact, with the advertising application in mind, we may view q as scaling the consumer’s
willingness to pay directly, or as the amount of advertising e¤ort exerted by the …rm, which
also enters the consumer’s utility function. Thus, the pro…t function in (2) is consistent
with the informative, as well as the persuasive and complementary views of advertising (see
Bagwell, 2007).
A more elaborate analysis of the impact of information markets on consumer surplus
and on the value of privacy would probably have to distinguish between information that
facilitates the creation of surplus, which is focus of present paper, and information that
impacts the distribution of surplus. For example, additional information could improve the
pricing power of the …rm and shift surplus from the consumer to the …rm (as for example in
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris, 2013).

II

Demand for Information

The value of information for each advertiser is determined by the incremental pro…ts they
could accrue by purchasing more cookies. Advertiser j is able to perfectly tailor his advertising spending to all consumers included in the targeted set Aj . In particular, we denote
the complete information demand for advertising space q (v) and pro…t level (v) by
q (v) , arg max [ (v; q)] ;
q2R+

(v) ,

(v; q (v)) :

By contrast, for all consumers in the complement (or residual) set ACj , advertiser j must
form an expectation over v ( ; j) , and choose a constant level of q for all such consumers.

9

Because the objective (v; q) is linear in v, the optimal level of advertising q (ACj ) is given
by
q (ACj ) , arg maxE (v; q) j v 2 ACj = q (E [v j v 62 Aj ]) :
q2R+

We can represent each advertiser’s information acquisition problem as the choice of a measurable subset A of the set of match values V :
Z
Z
(v; q (AC ))dF (v) ,
(4)
( (v; q (v)) p) dF (v) +
max
A V

AC

A

where, by symmetry, we can drop the index j for the advertiser.
By including all consumers with match value v into the targeted set A; the advertiser
can raise his gross pro…ts from the uninformed choice to the informed choice of q, albeit at
the unit cost p per consumer. In problem (4), the total price paid by the advertisers to the
data provider is then proportional to the measure of the targeted set, or p (A). Next we
characterize the properties of the optimal targeted set, as a function of the price of cookie p
and of the cost of advertising c. We begin with a simple example.

A

The Binary Action Environment

We start with linear matching costs and uniformly distributed match values; we then generalize the model to continuous actions and general distributions. Formally, let F (v) = v,
with v 2 [0; 1] and c m (q) = c q, with q 2 [0; 1]. The linear cost assumption is equivalent
to considering a binary action environment, q 2 f0; 1g, as the optimal policy will only take
those two values.
In this simpli…ed version of the model, targeting is very coarse: under complete information, it is optimal to contact a consumer v (i.e., to choose q (v) = 1) if and only if the
match value v exceeds the unit cost of advertising c. Thus, the complete information pro…ts
are given by
(v) , max fv c; 0g :
(5)
Likewise, the optimal action on the residual set is given by:
q (AC ) = 1 () E[v j v 2 AC ]

c:

As we show in Proposition 1, advertisers adopt one of two mutually exclusive strategies
to segment the consumer population: (i) positive targeting consists of buying information
on the highest-value consumers, contacting them and excluding everyone else; (ii) negative
targeting consists of buying information on the lowest-value consumers, avoiding them and
10

contacting everyone else. That is, advertisers choose a constant action q 2 f0; 1g on the
targeted set A and a di¤erent constant action on the residual set AC . The actions di¤er
across the targeted and the residual set as information about consumer v has a positive
value only if it a¤ects the advertiser’s subsequent action.
The choice of the optimal targeting strategy and the size of the targeted set naturally
depend on the cost of contact c and on the price of information p. We denote the optimal
targeted set by A (c; p). This set is de…ned by a threshold value v that either determines
a lower interval [v; v ] or an upper interval [v ; v], depending on the optimality of either
negative or positive targeting, respectively. The optimality of a threshold strategy follows
from the monotonicity of the pro…t in v and the binary action environment.
We identify the size of the targeted set by consider the willingness to pay for the marginal
cookie under each targeting strategy. If the advertiser adopts positive targeting, then he purchases information on all consumers up to the threshold v that leaves him with nonnegative
net utility, or v = c + p. Conversely, if the advertiser adopts negative targeting, then at the
marginal cookie, the gain from avoiding the contact, and thus saving c v, is just o¤set by
the price p of the cookie, and thus v = c p. Under either targeting strategy, the advertiser
trades o¤ the magnitude of the error made on the residual set with the cost of acquiring
additional information. Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal targeting strategy.
Proposition 1 (Targeting Strategy)
For all c; p > 0, the optimal targeted set A (c; p) is the interval of values v given by:
A (c; p) =

(

[0; max fc p; 0g] if c < 1=2;
[min fc + p; 1g ; 1] if c 1=2:

If the cost of advertising, i.e. the matching cost c, is particularly high, it is only pro…table
to bear the costs of generating awareness through advertising for very high-value customers,
about which information is acquired from the data provider. Conversely, for low costs of
advertising, all customers but the very low-value ones are pro…table, about which information
is purchased in order to exclude them from advertising.7
Proposition 1 establishes that the residual and the targeted set are both connected sets
(intervals), and that advertisers do not buy information about every consumer. The binary
environment illustrates some general features of optimal targeting and information policies.
In particular, three implications of Proposition 1 extend to general settings: (a) the residual
set is non-empty; (b) advertisers do not necessarily buy the cookies of high-value consumers;
7

The value c = 1=2 of the threshold which determines the choice of targeting strategy happens to coincide
with the threshold value that would determine whether advertisers contact all consumers, or none, under
the prior information. This is a special feature of the uniform distribution.
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and (c) the cost c of the advertising space guides their strategy. At the same time, the binary
environment cannot easily capture several aspects of the model, including the following: the
role of the distribution of match values (and of the relative size of the left and the right
tail in particular); the role of precise tailoring and the need for more detailed information;
the determinants of the advertisers’optimal targeting strategy; and the e¤ect of the cost of
advertising on the demand for information.

B

The Continuous Action Environment

We now proceed to analyze the general version of our model, in which we consider a continuum of actions and a general distribution of match values. It is helpful to …rst describe
the demand for advertising space when the value of the match v is known to the advertisers. Thus, we introduce the complete information decision and pro…ts. We now allow for
a general di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly convex cost function m (q) and assume that
m0 (0) = 0. This implies that the complete information demand for advertising is positive
for all match values.
The complete information demand for advertising space, denoted by q (v), is characterized by the …rst-order condition:
v = cm0 (q (v)) .
(6)
By contrast, if the advertiser has access to the distribution F (v) only, the prior-information
demand for advertising space q is given by
q , q (AC = V ) = q (E [v]) :

(7)

More generally, given a targeted set A, the optimal advertising level on the residual set AC
satis…es the following condition:
E[v j v 2 AC ] = cm0 (q (AC )):

(8)

Thus, the continuous-action model has the two key features that advertisers: (a) di¤erentiate spending levels within the targeted set, and (b) choose a uniform (strictly positive)
advertising level for the residual set. Moreover, the optimal advertising level on the residual
set q (AC ) varies with the composition of the targeted set.8
It follows from (6) and from the strict convexity of m (q) that the complete information
demand q (v) is strictly increasing. Since by the Envelope Theorem, d (v) =dv = q (v), the
8

These advertising policies might arguably represent the choices of a large brand marketer who wishes to
…ne-tune spending on a group of consumers, while adopting “umbrella spending” on everyone else.
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realized complete information pro…t
(v) is strictly convex in v. In contrast, the realized
pro…t under prior information is linear in v, and it is given by (v; q). Figure 2 describes
the pro…t function under complete information (v) and prior information (v; q).
Figure 2: Complete Information and Prior Information Profits
v
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As intuitive, under prior information, the …rm chooses excessive (wasteful) advertising
to low-value consumers and insu¢ cient advertising to higher-value consumers. The …rm
therefore has a positive willingness to pay for information, i.e., for cookies. The value of
information for every match value v is visually described by the di¤erence between the
complete information and the prior information pro…t function:
(v)

(v; q) :

(9)

Figure 2 suggests that the value of information is highest for extreme match values.9 Consequently, the next result establishes the optimality of a convex residual set of cookies. Each
advertising …rm purchases all cookies in a set:
A = [v; v1 ] [ [v2 ; v] :
The value of the lower and upper threshold are determined by c and p, thus v1 , v1 (c; p)
and v2 , v2 (c; p), respectively. Proposition 2 con…rms the intuition that the value of information is lowest for intermediate match values and highest for match values on the tails.
Proposition 2 (Convexity of Residual Set)
For all c; p > 0, the optimal residual set AC (c; p) is a non-empty interval [v1 (c; p) ; v2 (c; p)].
9

In this example, cm (q) = q 2 =2, and F (v) = v, v 2 [0; 1].
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Proposition 2 allows us to rewrite the …rm’s problem (4) as the choice of two thresholds,
v1 and v2 , that de…ne the targeted and residual sets, in terms of the gains relative to the
complete information solution:
max
v1 ;v2

Z

v2

[ (v; q ([v1 ; v2 ]))

(v) + p] dF (v) ;

(10)

v1
0

s.t. cm (q ([v1 ; v2 ])) = E [v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]] :
In program (10), as the bounds of the residual set are stretched (e.g., as v1 decreases), the advertiser earns a marginal bene…t of p and incurs a marginal cost of (v1 )
(v1 ; q ([v1 ; v2 ])) :
In addition, the advertiser adjusts the optimal action on the residual set to take the new
inference problem into account. (Of course, this has no …rst-order e¤ect on pro…ts at the optimum.) The average match value E [v j v 2 [v1 ; v2 ]] determines the demand for advertising
space in the residual set q ([v1 ; v2 ]), which in turn a¤ects the value of information.
Above, we described the value of information as the di¤erence between the pro…t of
an informed and an uninformed advertiser
(v)
(v; q). This revenue comparison is
conditional on the realization of the value v, and it is thus an ex-post comparison. For
the complete determination of the optimal policy, the advertiser has to evaluate how large
these gains from information are from an ex-ante point of view. The advertiser therefore
has to weigh the likelihood of di¤erent realizations, represented by the distribution F (v) of
values, and the gains from responding to the information, represented by the convexity of the
matching cost function m (q). To understand the exact nature of these trade-o¤s, it is useful
to begin with a “symmetric” environment for F (v) and m (q). In the context of negative
vs. positive targeting, this corresponds to a symmetric distribution F (v) around the mean
E [v] and a quadratic matching cost function m (q), such as in the example of Figure 2.

C

Joint vs. Exclusive Targeting

When matching costs are quadratic and match values are symmetrically distributed, advertisers always choose to target both low- and high-valuation consumers. In addition, under
these symmetry conditions, the residual set (i.e., the set of excluded valuations) is an interval centered on the prior mean E [v]. With a quadratic matching cost function, the optimal
complete information matching intensity is linear in v, or q (v) = v=c. Moreover, the gains
from information relative to the optimal matching policy for the mean value q (E [v]) are
identical for values equidistant from the mean, regardless of whether they are below or above
the mean. The value of information arises from adjustments of the matching intensity relative to the mean, i.e., increasing the matching intensity for values above the mean and
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decreasing the matching intensity for values below the mean. As the curvature of the cost
function is constant in q when m (q) is quadratic, this symmetry argument holds under any
symmetric distribution F (v). Proposition 3 veri…es the above intuition.
Proposition 3 (Joint Targeting: Positive and Negative)
With symmetrically distributed match values and quadratic matching costs, the optimal residual set is given by:
p
p
AC (c; p) = [E [v] 2 cp; E [v] + 2 cp]:
The measure of the residual set is increasing in the product of the price of information p
and the cost parameter c. Thus, an increase in either one depresses the number of cookies
acquired, and shrinks the targeted set by expanding the residual set toward the tails of the
distribution. Figure 3 illustrates the demand for cookies and the resulting pro…t levels in
the quadratic environment. The bold segment represent the active policy for value v, the
dashed line the inactive policy for value v.
Figure 3: Positive and Negative Targeting
v
0.5

P ositivetargeting

0.4

0.3

p

0.2

Negativetargeting
0.1

Residual set
p

0.0
0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

v

0.1

The symmetry conditions introduced in Proposition 3 have important implications not
only for the optimal location of the residual set, but also for its size. In particular, the
expected match value in the residual set is equal to the prior mean E[v], regardless of the
measure of the residual set AC . Therefore, the quantity of signals purchased by the advertiser
does not in‡uence the uninformed action q, and hence it does not a¤ect the marginal value
of information at any given v. This also implies that the willingness to pay for information
about any consumer v is independent of the distribution of match values.
In turn, the interaction between the symmetric gains from information and the symmetry
in the distribution suggest conditions under which either only positive or only negative
targeting become optimal, as we establish in the next set of results.
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While the residual set is always connected, as established by Proposition 2, the targeted
set may be as well. In particular, the choice of a single (positive or negative) targeting policy
depends on the value of information, and on its monotonicity properties over any interval.
Proposition 4 establishes su¢ cient conditions under which …rms demand cookies in a single
interval, i.e., they choose positive or negative targeting only.
Proposition 4 (Exclusive Targeting: Positive or Negative)
1. If m00 (q) and f (v) are decreasing, positive targeting is optimal:
A (c; p) = [v2 (c; p) ; v] ; and v2 > v:
2. If m00 (q) and f (v) are increasing, negative targeting is optimal:
A (c; p) = [v; v1 (c; p)] ; and v1 < v:
The su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 4 for exclusive targeting are perhaps best understood when viewed as departures from the symmetric conditions of Proposition 3. If, say,
positive targeting is to dominate negative targeting, then the gains from information must be
larger on the upside than on the downside of values. Recall that the gains from information
given the realization v are equal to (v)
(v; q). Thus, if the curvature of the matching
00
cost function m (q) is decreasing, the gains from information for realizations v equidistant
from the mean E [v] are larger above the mean than below. Now, this pairwise comparison
and reasoning could be undone by the relative likelihood of these two events. Thus, for
the su¢ cient conditions, we need to guarantee that the distribution of values supports this
pairwise argument, and hence the corresponding monotonicity requirement on the density
f (v). Figure 4 shows the equilibrium pro…t levels under positive targeting (a) and negative
targeting (b).10
10

In both panels, F (v) = v, v 2 [0; 1] and m (q) = q b =b. In panel (A), b = 3=2, and in panel (B), b = 3.
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Figure 4: Positive or Negative Targeting
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The optimality of targeting consumers in a single interval can be traced back to the two
sources of the value of information, i.e., wasteful advertising for low types and insu¢ cient
advertising for valuable consumers. Proposition 4 relates the potential for mismatch risk to
the properties of the match cost function. In particular, when the curvature of the matching
cost function is increasing, it becomes very expensive to tailor advertising to high-value
consumers. In other words, the risk of insu¢ cient advertising is not very high, given the cost
of advertising space. The …rm then purchases cookies related to lower-valued consumers.11
When choosing a targeting strategy, the advertiser trades o¤ the amount of learning over
values in the residual set with the costs and bene…ts of acquiring information about values in
the targeted set. The amount of learning is related to the range of the residual set jv2 v1 j,
while the costs and bene…ts of information are related to the probability measure of the
targeted set. Therefore, targeting a less likely subset of values requires a smaller expense
(in terms of the cost of cookies) in order to generate a given amount of information. The
distribution of match values then a¤ects the optimality of positive vs. negative targeting: for
example, under a matching cost function with constant curvature, decreasing density f (v)
leads to positive targeting, and vice-versa.

D

Empirical Relevance

Both positive and negative targeting strategies are relevant for online advertising markets.
In particular, negative targeting is explicitly allowed as a re…nement option by most large
11

Examples of matching cost functions with concave marginal costs include power functions, m (q) = q a
with a < 2. Examples of convex marginal costs include those derived from the Butters (1977) exponential
matching technology, i.e., m (q) = a ln (1 q) ; with a > 0, and power functions m (q) = q a , with a > 2.
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1.0

v

providers of advertising space, including Google, Yahoo!, and Facebook.12 Clearly, an advertiser may adopt either or both strategies, and the choice of a strategy in any speci…c
context will depend on the distribution of consumer values and on the cost of advertising.
For instance, in the market for credit scores, a credit card company may want to acquire the
pro…les of consumers with the lowest scores, and make sure not to reach out to them; or it
may select a small group of high credit-worthiness consumers, and reach out to them more
aggressively.
Within the marketing and economics literature, Pancras and Sudhir (2007) document
the use of both positive and negative targeting in the context of retail shopping. While the
main focus of Pancras and Sudhir (2007) is on competition and information-sharing among
catalogue merchants and manufacturers, they also examine the pricing of data by several
intermediaries.13
More recent studies provide indirect evidence in favor of adopting negative targeting
to exploit the consumers’purchase cycle. For example, in the context of sponsored-search
advertising, Blake, Nosko and Tadelis (2013) document that eBay obtains a positive return on
investment only for consumers who have not visited the eBay site in the last two months. A
similar pattern for the pro…tability of di¤erent customers also appears in the case of (o- ine)
direct-marketing companies documented by Anderson and Simester (2013). In both contexts,
a cost-e¢ cient strategy for retailers consists of acquiring information about consumers with
recent purchases and appropriately reducing the amount of advertising directed at them.
These consumers are both low-value (at this point in their purchase cycle) and low in number,
relative to the overall population, which makes negative targeting especially pro…table.14
Finally, as real-time bidding makes online data markets more integrated with the advertising exchanges, we can identify two contrasting forces in terms of our model. On the
one hand, the combined sale of data and advertising favors positive targeting almost by
construction. On the other hand, when the cost of the data is tied to the price paid for advertising, contacting high-value consumers becomes increasingly costly. If targeting through
cookies results in a higher marginal cost of advertising, advertisers may specify lower bids
for selected consumer segments (i.e., adopt negative targeting) in order to reduce their total
expenditure.
12

For example, Facebook o¤ers negative targeting based on third-party data as a “custom audience”
selection criterion for advertisers. See https://developers.facebook.com/docs/ads-api/targeting and “Buy
Signal: Facebook Widens Data Targeting,” The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2013.
13
Our model so far abstracts from competition among advertisers. In the working paper Bergemann and
Bonatti (2013), we introduce pecuniary externalities through a market-clearing price of advertising space.
The characterization of the optimal targeting strategies of Proposition 4 is unchanged.
14
While advertisers may be able to identify their own repeat shoppers, they need to purchase third-party
information about their competitors’customers who are at a similar stage in their purchase cycle.
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E

Implications for Publishers

We conclude this section by examining the interaction between the markets for data and online advertising. In particular, we assess the e¤ect of data sales on the demand for advertising
space and the implications of vertical integration between publishers and data providers.
The e¤ect of the price of data on the total demand for advertising space is unclear a
priori. For instance, the demand for advertising space may increase or decrease in the
amount of information available to advertisers, depending on whether the data is used for
positive or negative targeting. To formalize this trade-o¤, consider the total demand for
advertising space as a function of the targeted set A (c; p). Because any advertiser who
wishes to generate match intensity q with a consumer must purchase an amount of space
equal to m (q), the total demand for advertising is given by
M (A) ,

Z

m (q (v)) dF (v) +

Z

m(q (AC ))dF (v) .

(11)

AC

A

We are interested in the e¤ect of the amount of data sold (A) on the total demand for
advertising M (A). Figure 5 considers the case of negative targeting, and compares the
demand for advertising m (q (v)) for …xed targeted and residual sets, under two di¤erent
matching cost functions.
Figure 5: Total Demand for Advertising
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As is intuitive, the total demand for advertising (i.e., the area under the solid lines in
Figure 5) is increasing in the measure of the targeted set A when the complete information
demand for advertising m (q (v)) is convex in v. Our next result formalizes the interaction of
the data and advertising markets by relating the sign of the cross-market externality to the
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v

properties of the matching cost function. In Proposition 5 (as well as in Propositions 7, 8,
and 9), we assume that the distribution of match values and the matching cost function lead
to exclusive targeting (positive or negative). Proposition 4 provides su¢ cient conditions.
Proposition 5 (Market Interaction)
Assume exclusive (positive or negative) targeting is optimal.
1. If m0 (q) is log-concave, the demand for advertising M (A (c; p)) is decreasing in p.
2. If m0 (q) is log-convex, the demand for advertising M (A (c; p)) is increasing in p.
The proof of Proposition 5 establishes that convexity of the complete-information demand
for advertising is equivalent, in terms of the primitives of our model, to the log-concavity
of the marginal cost of matching. Furthermore, the conditions in Proposition 5 are related
to those for the optimality of exclusive targeting (Proposition 4). In particular, if positive
targeting is optimal, the demand for advertising space is decreasing in p (but not vice-versa).
Finally, we can leverage the results of Proposition 5 to analyze the problem a company
(e.g., Google, Yahoo!, or Facebook) that acts as both data provider (by providing information that allows targeted advertising) and publisher (by allowing advertisers to contact consumers). In particular, under the su¢ cient conditions of Proposition 5, the publisher wants
to allow either complete access or no access to the data (corresponding to p 2 f0; 1g).
In other words, our analysis suggests which market conditions are conducive to the wide
di¤usion of user-level information among the advertisers, and conversely which conditions
discourage sellers from o¤ering precise targeting opportunities. In particular, when the demand for advertising space is decreasing in p, a publisher with access to data can bene…t
from the indirect sale of information, i.e. from bundling information and advertising space
in order to drive up demand for the latter.15

III

The Price of Data

In this section, we explore the determinants of the monopoly price of data. We begin with
the cost of advertising c, before turning to the fragmentation of data sales, the size of the
database, and the precision of the data provider’s information. In the latter three cases, we
highlight the role of the residual set in determining the willingness to pay for information,
and of the ability of the monopolist to in‡uence its composition.
15

We could also endow the publisher with market power, i.e., allow the publisher and the data provider
to coordinate their actions, without qualitatively a¤ecting this result.
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An important implication of the demand analysis in Section II is that the advertisers’
optimal targeting strategy is not in‡uenced qualitatively by the price of data p. In particular,
under the conditions of Propositions 1, 3 or 4, the price of data a¤ects the size of the targeted
set only. In other words, throughout this section, the monopolist takes the shape of the
targeted set A (c; p) as given, and chooses the revenue-maximizing price
p = arg max [p
p

A

(A (c; p))] :

Data and Advertising: Complements or Substitutes?

From the point of view of an advertiser, the data provider and the publisher of advertising
space are part of a value chain. It is therefore tempting to view the interaction of the
data provider and publisher as a vertical chain (formed by strategic complements), and to
associate with it the risk of double marginalization. This would suggest that an increase in
the cost c of advertising would lead optimally to a partially o¤setting decrease in the price
of information p (c). But at closer inspection, the relationship between the price of data
and that of advertising is more subtle.
The purchase of data may allow the advertiser to concentrate the purchase of advertising
space on a smaller but highly relevant segment. Thus, from the point of view of the advertiser,
the data provides an option whose value might be increasing as the advertising space becomes
more expensive.
Therefore, data purchases act as strategic complements to advertising purchases for high
value realizations, but as strategic substitutes for low valuations, because after learning of
a low-value consumer, the advertiser reduces his matching intensity. This subtlety in the
interaction already appeared in the binary environment of Subsection II.A, to which we now
return. The following results are an immediate consequence of Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 (Data and Advertising)
1. For all c 2 [0; 1], the monopoly price of a cookie is:
p (c) = (1=2) min fc; 1

cg :

2. The equilibrium sales of cookies are given by the targeted set A (c; p (c)):
(
[0; c=2]
if c < 1=2;
A (c; p (c)) =
[(1 + c) =2; 1] if c 1=2:
3. The equilibrium price, sales and pro…ts of the data provider are single peaked in c.

21

Recall the characterization of the advertiser’s optimal targeting strategy in the binaryaction setting (Proposition 1): positive targeting is adopted when the cost of advertising c
is su¢ ciently high and negative targeting when the cost of advertising is low. Proposition 6
shows that both the price of the data and the pro…ts of the data provider are non-monotone
in c. Intuitively, the value of information is highest for intermediate levels of c. In the
absence of information, advertisers choose either q0 = 0 or q0 = 1, depending on the cost of
the advertising space c. In particular, for very low and very high values of c, the availability
of data modi…es there optimal action only on a limited set of consumers. Consequently, the
willingness to pay for information is also limited.
The binary-action environment suggests which market conditions are more conducive to
the pro…tability of a data provider. Perhaps contrary to a …rst intuition, niche markets
with a high cost of advertising space and few pro…table consumers are not necessarily the
best environment. While the availability of data would have a large impact (demands for
advertising would be nil without information), the data provider’s pro…ts are constrained by
the low levels of surplus downstream. Instead, markets with relatively large fractions of both
pro…table and unpro…table consumers yield a higher value of information, which translates
into higher prices for data and higher provider pro…ts.
While general results on the comparative statics of the monopoly price are harder to
obtain in the continuous-action environment, more intuition can be obtained from speci…c
examples. For instance, if joint targeting is optimal, an immediate implication of Proposition
3 is that the monopoly price is inversely proportional to the cost of advertising space. If
exclusive targeting is optimal, and match values are uniformly distributed, the log-concavity
(log-convexity) of m0 (q) is a su¢ cient condition for the monopoly price to increase (decrease)
with c.16 Taken together, these partial results suggest that the non-monotonicity of the
monopoly price in Proposition 6 is deeply tied to changes in the optimal targeting strategy
induced by changes in the cost of advertising space.
In the following subsections, we take the cost of advertising space as given. We return to
our continuous-action environment in order to illustrate the role of the composition of the
targeted and residual sets.

B

Data Sales Fragmentation

We have so far assumed a monopoly structure for the data industry. We now assess the
consequences of competition among sellers, and of the structure of the data industry. In
16

In the working paper Bergemann and Bonatti (2013), we show that the conditions of Proposition 5 also
determine the e¤ect of the cost c on the advertisers’marginal willingness to pay for any targeted set A. The
comparative statics of the monopoly price require further assumptions on the distribution of values.
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particular, we focus on the externality that each seller’s price imposes on the other sellers
through the composition of the advertisers’ residual set. Our formulation follows closely
the business model of the data exchange, where a data provider does not buy and resell
information, but rather o¤ers a platform for matching individual buyers and sellers, who set
their own prices.17
Formally, we consider a continuum of data sellers, and we assume that each seller has
exclusive information about one consumer segment i. Thus, each seller sets the price for one
cookie only. We seek to characterize a symmetric equilibrium of the pricing game. In the
following discussion, we assume that positive targeting is optimal (Proposition 4 provides
su¢ cient conditions). Analogous results hold for the case of negative targeting, as stated in
Proposition 7.
We begin by considering an advertiser’s demand for information. Suppose all sellers but
j charge price p j . Every advertiser then chooses the targeted set A = [v2 ; v] where the
threshold value v2 (p j ) solves the condition
p

j

=

(v2 )

(v2 ; q ([v; v2 ])) :

Thus, the cookie sold by seller j will have a distribution of values across advertisers that
depends on the other sellers’prices through their e¤ect on the residual set. In particular,
a symmetric price pro…le p j can be summarized by the threshold v2 that it induces. Now
consider an advertiser whose match value with the cookie of seller j is equal to v. This
advertiser’s willingness to pay is equal to the di¤erential pro…t under the threshold strategy
v2 (p j ). Therefore, seller j faces the inverse demand function p (v; v2 ) given by
p (v; v2 ) ,

(v; q ([v; v2 ])) :

(v)

(12)

Because match values with a given seller v ( ; j) are identically distributed, we can reformulate
the seller’s problem as choosing a threshold v to maximize pro…ts given the advertisers’
threshold v2 . A symmetric equilibrium threshold then solves the following problem:
v2 = arg max [p (v; v2 ) (1
v

F (v))] .

The key di¤erence with the monopoly problem lies in the residual advertising intensity
q ([v; v2 ]) ; which cannot be in‡uenced by the price of any individual seller. More precisely, suppose the monopolist considers expanding the supply of cookies, hence lowering the
17

We may also interpret the fragmentation of data sales as a market where individual users are able to
sell their own data.
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threshold v2 . By increasing supply, he would reduce the gap between complete and prior
information pro…ts for the marginal consumer v2 . Naturally then, the monopolist would have
to lower the price. At the same time, the composition of the residual set will have changed.
In fact, the average value on the residual set will have decreased, and thus the advertising
level on the residual set will be lower. But this means that the value of information for
the marginal consumer just below the targeted set has increased, and hence the marginal
advertiser just below the threshold will have a higher value of information. Now, this e¤ect
provides an additional incentive to lower prices and expand supply for the monopolist. Competing sellers do not internalize the positive externality present across cookie sales. Higher
prices under fragmented data sales are then due to the absence of a composition e¤ect.
The fragmented data sales is illustrative of a more general result. Suppose we were
to consider n symmetric data sellers, each holding information about a measure 1=n of
consumers distributed identically according to F (v). The n sellers set prices simultaneously.
Consider now the trade-o¤ facing a speci…c seller. She knows that, by lowering her price,
all advertisers will purchase more from her, as well as from everyone else. This occurs
because the action q on the residual set will decrease. However, as for the case of fragmented
sales, the composition e¤ect is attenuated in equilibrium by the fact that all other sellers
are holding their prices …xed. Thus, in a symmetric equilibrium the price is increasing in
n: As the number of sellers grows large, the equilibrium price approaches the price under
fragmentation, where the action on the residual set is constant.
To summarize, we obtain the following comparative statics of the equilibrium price.
Proposition 7 (Equilibrium under Data Fragmentation)
Assume exclusive (positive or negative) targeting is optimal.
1. The symmetric equilibrium price of cookies with a continuum of data sellers p is higher
than the monopoly price p .
2. The symmetric equilibrium price with n independent and exclusive data sellers p (n)
is increasing in n, and approaches p as n ! 1.
Clearly, if many sellers would lead to a duplication in the datasets, sellers would only
be able to capture the incremental value of their information, thus driving prices down. In
particular, there will exist a critical level of duplication for which the monopoly and the
oligopoly prices are equal.

C

Reach of the Database

So far, we implicitly assumed that the monopolist’s dataset covers all consumers, i.e., that
it has maximal reach. We now explore the implications of limited reach on the monopoly
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price of cookies, and on the equilibrium pro…ts of the data provider and the advertisers.
We assume that the data provider owns information about a fraction < 1 of all consumers. Advertisers know the distribution of match values of consumers present in the
database, and of those outside of it. In real-world data markets, consumers in a database
may have di¤erent characteristics from those outside of it, i.e., the presence of a cookie on
a given consumer is per se informative. For simplicity, we assume that the two distributions
are identical, so that the measure of consumers in the dataset is given by F (v). We then
have the following result.
Proposition 8 (Reach and Demand)
Assume exclusive (positive or negative) targeting is optimal. Then the advertisers’marginal
willingness to pay p (A; ) is increasing in for all A.
Quite surprisingly, the demand function for information shifts out as more consumers are
reached by the database. That is, an advertiser marginal willingness to pay for information
increases with . The reason behind this result can be traced back to the e¤ects of a larger
database on the optimal action in the residual set q (AC ). When positive targeting is optimal
(so that A = [v2 ; v]), the average type in the residual set AC is given by
E[v j v 2 AC ] = E [v j v

v2 ] + (1

) E [v] .

(13)

Because the average type is decreasing in for all A, the quantity of advertising demanded
on the residual set is decreasing in . Thus, the willingness to pay for information on the
marginal consumer v2 increases. A similar argument applies to the case of negative targeting.
Conversely, under the conditions of Proposition 3 (joint targeting), the quantity of advertising
q demanded on the residual set is independent of . Hence, the reach parameter has no
e¤ect on the monopoly price.
Even under exclusive targeting, Proposition 8 does not imply that the monopoly price is
increasing in the reach parameter . On the contrary, as the reach of the database increases,
the optimal monopoly price is pushed lower by two e¤ects. First, the willingness to pay for
any targeted set increases (Proposition 8), which makes raising price and restricting supply
more costly. Second, the optimal action in the residual set is now more sensitive to the
price of cookies. This is due to the composition e¤ect: the average consumer outside the
targeted set becomes less likely to have a high match value; as a consequence, the quantity
of advertising demanded on the residual set decreases faster as the targeted set expands.
Both these e¤ects induce the monopolist to lower price and expand supply as the database
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becomes less limited.18
Two …nal remarks are in order. First, a reduction in price implies an increase in the
range of data sold by the monopolist [v2 ; v] as the reach increases. Therefore, an increase
in the reach leads to higher data sales. Thus advertisers pay a lower price and access more
information, which implies that their pro…ts increase. This means that an increase in data
availability can induce a Pareto improvement in the market for information.
Second, note that we have assumed in Proposition 8 that exclusive (positive or negative)
targeting is optimal for all price levels. Informally, this means one source of advertising
mismatch (wasteful spending or insu¢ cient intensity) is particularly prominent. However,
the price of information is not generally continuous or monotone in the reach parameter
. In particular, jumps may occur when the targeting policy induced by the monopolist
switches from joint (both positive and negative) targeting for low reach values to exclusive
(positive or negative) targeting for high reach values .

D

Precision of the Database

We now assess the implications of the quality of the database, as measured by the data
provider’s ability to estimate the consumer’s characteristics. Because advertisers are riskneutral and the pro…t function (2) is linear in v, the choice of action q and willingness to
pay for information depend only on the conditional expectation of the match value. It is
then convenient to interpret v as a posterior mean. In particular, we assume the true match
value is unknown to all, but the data provider has access to an informative signal. The
data provider’s signals induce posterior means v distributed according to F (v). We then
relate the precision of the data provider’s information to the properties of the distribution
of estimated match values.
We model the precision of the database through the spread of the distribution of match
values. We then assume that the distribution of values is ordered by increasing variance.19
Formally, this means that EF [v] is constant in a spread parameter k, and that
Fk (v) , F ((v

E [v]) = (k)) , with

0

(k) > 0:

(14)

We de…ne the quantity of data demanded at price p as the measure of the optimal targeted
set Ak (p) under the distribution Fk (v). We then derive comparative statics of the demand
for information with respect to the precision of the database.
18
In the working paper, Bergemann and Bonatti (2013), we identify su¢ cient conditions on the distribution
of values under which the monopoly price of data is decreasing in its reach.
19
This stochastic order is a speci…c instance of the rotation order, see Johnson and Myatt (2006). It
obtains, for example, when the seller observes a truth-or-noise signal of the underlying value.
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Proposition 9 (Demand for Information)
1. Assume joint targeting is optimal. The marginal willingness to pay pk (A) is constant
in k, and the quantity of data demanded is strictly increasing in k.
2. Assume exclusive targeting is optimal. The marginal willingness to pay pk (A) is increasing in k, and the quantity of data demanded is increasing in k if E [v] 62 Ak (p) :
Let us consider the cases of joint and exclusive targeting separately. Under joint targeting,
the optimal action on the residual set q is una¤ected by the spread of the distribution.
However, as k increases, more probability mass is placed on the tails of the distribution, so
that the total demand for information is higher. Under exclusive targeting, the optimal action
on the residual set moves closer to q (v) or q (v) as the spread increases. The composition
e¤ect therefore raises the di¤erential pro…ts on any given v, hence the willingness to pay for
the marginal cookie. This may lead to a higher or lower quantity of data sold, depending
on the level of purchases. In particular, if the cookie E [v] is in the residual set, then a more
spread out distribution implies higher sales.
We now turn attention to the monopoly price of cookies. We …rst analyze the case of
joint targeting. In Proposition 10, we maintain the assumptions of Proposition 3, namely
the symmetry of F (v) and the quadratic pro…ts.
Proposition 10 (Monopoly Price, Joint Targeting)
If joint targeting is optimal, the monopoly price of a cookie is increasing in k.
An important feature of the symmetric quadratic environment is that the distribution
of types a¤ects the monopolist’s problem through the quantity of data demanded, and not
through the marginal value of information. This allows for clean comparative statics of the
monopoly price in Proposition 10. Notice, however, that the monopoly quantity responds
di¤erently from the price, and it may increase or decrease even if the price is increasing (see
Johnson and Myatt (2006) for a thorough discussion).
The e¤ects of information precision on the monopoly price under exclusive targeting
are rather intricate. On the one hand, information precision a¤ects advertisers’willingness
to pay for the marginal cookie. On the other hand, the spread of the values distribution
directly impacts the quantity of data sold. Under the joint restriction of power cost functions
m (q) = q b and uniformly distributed types over [(1 k) =2; (1 + k) =2], it is possible to show
that the spread k has a positive impact on the monopoly price and a negative impact on the
quantity of data sold.20
20

This result does not depend on whether positive or negative targeting is optimal (i.e. on whether the
cost parameter b > 2). The details are available from the authors.
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IV

Beyond Linear Pricing

We have focused so far on a fairly speci…c set of information structures (cookies-based) and
pricing mechanisms (linear prices). We now return to the monopoly environment, and we
generalize our analysis of data sales to address two closely related questions: (i) What is
the optimal mechanism for a monopolist to sell information? (ii) Are there conditions under
which pricing of individual cookies can implement the optimal mechanism?
Up to now, we assumed that the advertisers are symmetric in the distribution of the
match values. Moreover, the advertisers attached the same willingness to pay to a consumer
with match value v. Thus, from an ex-ante point of view, the advertisers are all identical, and
their common ex ante value of information is assumed to be known to all market participants,
including the data provider. Therefore, it is as if the data provider has complete information
about the preferences of the advertisers. In this setting, suppose the data provider could
choose among unrestricted pricing mechanisms and information structures, i.e. mappings
from consumer match values to signals for the advertisers. The data provider would then be
able to extract the entire ex ante surplus from the advertisers, for example, by charging a
bundle price for the entire database equal to the ex-ante value of information.
In this section, we allow for a private-information component in the advertisers’willingness to pay to match with a consumer with characteristics v. Thus, we consider advertisers
who di¤er in their marginal willingness to pay, denoted by 2
= [0; 1]. Extending the
earlier expression (2), the net value of a match is now given by:
(v; q; ) , vq

c m (q) :

The marginal willingness to pay is private information to each advertiser and is distributed
in the population of advertisers according to a continuous distribution function G ( ) with
density g ( ). For this section, we return to the binary decision environment of Subsection
II.A, and restrict attention to binary decisions q 2 f0; 1g of the advertiser (or alternatively
linear matching cost m (q) = q). The net value of a match is then given by, extending the
earlier expression (5):
(v; ) , max f v c; 0g :
Thus, for advertising to generate positive value, the realization of must exceed c as v 2 [0; 1].
We now explore the data provider’s ability to screen advertisers by o¤ering di¤erent information structures (or “information policies”), and by pricing the amount of information
in a nonlinear way. We begin our analysis with noiseless information structures, i.e., deterministic mappings from the advertiser’s payo¤-relevant states v 2 V to a set of signals, and
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we characterize the optimal mechanism within this class.21
With binary actions, the socially e¢ cient information policy can be induced by a threshold v ( ) that informs advertisers perfectly and without noise about the match value v if
and only if v exceeds the threshold v ( ) given by:
c
v ( )= .

(15)

In other words, the data provider can attain the e¢ cient allocation of information through an
information policy based on cookies. Under the e¢ cient information policy, each advertiser
receives information about every realization of v such that v v ( ). Consequently, advertisers adopt positive targeting, i.e., contact all consumers they receive information about,
and ignore the residual users.22 The expected gross value of the e¢ cient information policy
for an advertiser with willingness to pay is:
w ( ),

Z

1

( v

c) dF (v) :

c

Now consider an arbitrary noiseless information policy with threshold x. The value of
this information structure to an advertiser with willingness to pay is given by:
w ( ; x) ,

Z

1

( v

c) dF (v) :

(16)

x

Note the submodularity property of w ( ; x), namely that @ 2 w ( ; x) =@ @x = v < 0. Therefore, any implementable information policy leads to more data, and hence lower thresholds
x, being assigned to advertisers with higher willingness to pay . Given the noiseless nature
of the information policy, the above problem (16) is akin to a nonlinear pricing problem,
where the quantity variable is the amount of information, or the number of cookies sold.
In the associated direct revelation mechanism, each advertiser communicates his willingness to pay, and in exchange is o¤ered a set of cookies and a price for the bundle of cookies.
The set of cookies is determined by the threshold v ( ) and hence the associated quantity
of cookies is
Q ( ) , 1 F (v ( )) ;
and we denote the transfer payment in the direct mechanism by T ( ). As in the standard
21

In the working paper Bergemann and Bonatti (2013), we establish that noiseless information structures
remain optimal even when we consider arbitrary information structures. This result requires substantial
additional language and notation, and is thus relegated to the working paper.
22
In this binary action setting, providing information about the complement set and inducing negative
targeting yields an identical outcome.
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analysis of revenue-maximizing mechanisms, we impose a regularity condition such that the
local incentive conditions generate the requisite monotone allocation, which in this context
is simply the requirement that the “virtual utility”
1

G( )
g( )

(17)

is increasing in . We maintain this restriction in Proposition 11, whose proof is in the
working paper, Bergemann and Bonatti (2013).
Proposition 11 (Information Policy)
The optimal information policy is a noiseless information policy with threshold
c

v ( )=

1 G( )
g( )

.

(18)

Perhaps the surprising element in the determination of the information policy is that the
distributional information about the match values (i.e., f (v) or F (v)) does not appear in
the description of the optimal information policy. This results from the additivity of the
utility of all types in the number of user contacts.23
The direct mechanism establishes some key properties of the information policy. In
particular, T ( ) and Q ( ) are strictly increasing in , as shown in Proposition 12. A related,
indirect mechanism speaks more directly to the problem of data selling and access to the
database. Namely, the data provider could specify a nonlinear pricing scheme, or conversely
a price for incremental access to the database. With Q ( ) strictly increasing in , we can
de…ne a nonlinear pricing scheme, which associates every quantity Q with the transfer of the
corresponding type Q 1 ( ):
P (Q) , T Q 1 ( ) .
We de…ne the price p (Q) as the price for incremental access to the database, or the marginal
price that we can readily interpret as the price of an additional cookie:
p (Q) , P 0 (Q) .
Under slightly stronger regularity conditions than (17), Proposition 12 establishes that the
incremental pricing p (Q) implements the optimal information policy. In fact, the data
provider o¤er access to additional cookies at a declining price that mirrors the logic of
23

More speci…cally, the probability density at the threshold f (v ( )) increases the willingness to pay and
the information rent at the same rate.
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quantity discounts in Maskin and Riley (1984). The proof of this result can be found in the
working paper.
Proposition 12 (Prices and Quantities)
1. The number of cookies sold, Q ( ) and the transfer T ( ) are increasing in .
2. The incremental cookie price p (Q) is decreasing in Q and decentralizes the direct optimal mechanism if (1 G ( )) =g ( ) is decreasing.
Thus, the data provider can decentralize the optimal direct mechanism by allowing advertisers to access a given portion of the database, with volume discounts for those who
demand a larger amount of cookies. This establishes an equivalent implementation of the
optimal mechanism, based on advertiser self-selection of a subset of cookies. We can then
view the (constant) monopoly price p for cookies (which yields a total payment pQ) as a
linear approximation of the optimal nonlinear tari¤ T (Q) in this particular case.24

V

Concluding Remarks

We analyzed the sale of individual-level information in a setting that captures the key economic features of the market for third-party data. Speci…cally, in our model, a monopolistic
data provider determines the price to access informative signals about each consumer’s preferences.
Our …rst set of results characterized the demand for such signals by advertisers who wish
to tailor their spending to the match value with each consumer. We showed how properties
of the complete information pro…t function determine the optimality of an informationpurchasing strategy that achieves positive targeting, negative targeting, or both. We also
explored the interaction between the markets for data and advertising, and we showed that
a publisher of advertising space can, but need not, bene…t from the availability of data to
the advertisers.
Turning to monopoly pricing of cookies, we established that the ability to in‡uence the
composition of the advertisers’targeted and residual sets was the key driver of the optimal
(linear) prices. As a consequence, both the reach of the monopolist’s database and the
concentration of data sales provide incentives to lower prices.
We then considered an environment in which advertisers di¤er in their willingness to
pay, and we showed that cookies-based pricing can be part of an (approximate) optimal
24

See Rogerson (2003) for bounds on the loss in pro…ts from simpler mechanisms such as linear pricing.
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mechanism for the sale of information. In particular, we showed that the data provider can
decentralize the optimal mechanism by o¤ering a nonlinear pricing schedule for cookies.
We, arguably, made progress towards understanding basic aspects of data pricing and
data markets. We did so by making a number of simplifying assumptions. A more comprehensive view of data markets would require a richer environment. In the present model,
the information supported the formation of valuable matches, and hence could be viewed as
increasing the surplus of the consumer and the advertiser at the same time. But if information could also impact the division of surplus between them, then the value of information
(and the corresponding value of privacy) would require a more subtle analysis.
In the present model neither the advertiser nor the publisher had access to any proprietary information about the consumers. In reality, advertisers and (more prominently) large
publishers and advertising exchanges maintain databases of their own. Thus, the nature of
the information sold and the power to set prices depend on the initial allocation of information across market participants. Moreover, online data transactions are inherently two-sided.
Presently, we analyzed the price charged by the data provider to the advertisers. But there
are cost of acquiring the data from individuals, publishers, or advertisers. Ultimately, the
cost of acquiring information for the data provider should be related to the value of privacy,
which may limit the availability of data or raise its price.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the advertisers’ optimal action on the residual set is
given by q (AC ) = 0. The value of the marginal cookie is then given by max f0; v cg,
which is increasing in v. We show that the value of information is strictly monotone in v.
Notice that adding higher-v cookies to the targeted set does not change the optimal action
on the residual set, because it lowers the expected value of a consumer v 2 AC . Thus, if
advertisers buy cookie v, they also buy all cookies v 0 > v. Conversely, if the optimal action
on the residual set is given by q (AC ) = 1, the value of the marginal cookie is max f0; c vg.
By a similar argument, the value of information is strictly decreasing in v: if advertisers buy
cookie v, they also buy all cookies v 0 < v.
Now consider the advertiser’s pro…ts under positive and negative targeting. In the former
case, the advertisers’pro…ts are given by
+ (c; p) , max
v

Z

1

(x

c

p) dF (x) =

Z

1

p) dF (x) :

(x

c

(x

c) dF (x)

c+p

v

In the latter case, pro…ts are given by
(c; p) , max
v

Z

1

(x

c) dF (x)

pF (v) =

v

Z

1

pF (c

p) :

c p

Now consider the di¤erence
+

(c; p)

(c; p) = p (F (c

p) + F (c + p)

1)

Z

c+p

(v

c) dF (v) :

(19)

c p

Under the uniform distribution, the second term in (19) is nil, while the …rst is equal to
p (2c 1), which establishes the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose towards a contradiction that the optimal residual set
AC is not an interval. Let q0 = q (AC ) denote the match intensity with all consumers in
the residual set. By equation (8), we know q0 is the optimal match intensity for the average
type vA = E [v j v 62 A]. Suppose vA 2 A. Now consider two consumers with v 00 > v 0 and
q (v 00 ) > q (v 0 ) > q0 such that the …rm buys cookie v 0 but not v 00 . If AC is not an interval,
either such a pair exists, or there exists a pair with v 00 < v 0 and q (v 00 ) < q (v 0 ) < q0 such
that the …rm buys cookie v 0 but not v 00 . Consider the former case, and compute the change
in pro…ts obtained by swapping cookies, i.e., purchasing (an equal number of) cookies v 00
instead of cookies v 0 . De…ne the di¤erence between complete and incomplete information
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pro…ts as
(v; q0 ) = v (q (v)

q0 )

c (m (q (v))

m (q0 )) ;

and notice that v (v; q0 ) = (q (v) q0 ) : Therefore q (v 00 ) > q (v 0 ) > q0 implies (v 00 ; q0 ) >
(v 0 ; q0 ). Because the advertiser gains (v 00 ; q0 ) and loses (v 0 ; q0 ), it follows that the swap
strictly improves pro…ts. An identical argument applies to the case of q (v 00 ) < q (v 0 ) < q0 .
Finally, if vA 62 A, then a pro…table deviation consists of not purchasing vA : advertisers
avoid paying a positive price, and the optimal action on the residual set does not change.
Proof of Proposition 3. If costs are quadratic, so are the complete information pro…ts.
By symmetry of the distribution, v0 = E [v j v 2 [v0 "; v0 + "]] for any " > 0: The marginal
value of information is then given by
p (v) =

(v)

(vq (v0 )

cm (q (v0 ))) = (v0

v)2 =4c:

Solving for v0 yields the optimal residual set as a function of p and c.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the necessary conditions for the optimal residual set
AC to be given by an interior interval [v1 ; v2 ]. De…ne the expected value on the residual set,
v0 , E[v j v 2 AC ].
For ease of notation, let (v) ,
(v) : It follows that q0 , q (AC ) = q (v0 ), and by
the envelope theorem q0 = 0 (v0 ). The marginal value of information at v is then given by
(v) ( (v0 ) + (v v0 ) 0 (v0 )), and its derivative with respect to v is given by 0 (v) 0 (v0 ).
Optimality of an interior residual set requires that the marginal value of information is equal
to p at the two extremes i.e.,
Z

v2

( 0 (v)

0

(v0 )) dv = 0:

v1

Under concavity of

0

(v), however, we have

Z

Z

v2
0

( (v)

0

(v0 )) dv

v1

v2
00

(v0 ) (v

v0 ) dv;

v1

which is non-positive if f (v) is non-decreasing. This implies negative targeting. A similar
last step implies positive targeting.
Finally, we relate the curvature of the pro…t function to that of the match cost function.
The envelope theorem implies 0 (v) = q (v), and implicit di¤erentiation of the …rst order
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condition yields
00

1

(v) = (cm00 (q (v)))

Because q (v) is strictly increasing, we conclude that

000

:

(v) > 0 if and only if m000 (q) < 0.

Proof of Proposition 5. We …rst establish a property of the complete information demands
for advertising. Di¤erentiating m (q (v)) with respect to v, we obtain
dm (q (v))
dq (v)
m0 (q (v))
= m0 (q (v))
=
:
dv
dv
cm00 (q (v))
Therefore, the demand for advertising space is convex in v if m00 (q) =m0 (q) is decreasing in
q, i.e., m0 (q) is log-concave. Conversely, m (q (v)) is concave in v if m0 (q) is log-convex.
(1.) We focus on the negative-targeting case A = [v; v1 ], but all arguments immediately
extend to the case of positive targeting. Now consider the publisher’s revenues as a function
of p: The total demand for advertising is given by
M (A) =

Z

v1

m (q (v)) dF (v) + (1

F (v1 )) m (q ([v1 ; v])) :

v

Letting v^ , E [v j v 2 [v1 ; v]], we have
@M
@v1

= (m (q (v1 ))

m (q (^
v ))) f (v1 ) + (1

= f (v1 ) (m (q (v1 ))

F (v1 )) m0 (q (^
v ))

m0 (q (^
v ))
m (q (^
v ))) + f (v1 )
(^
v
00
cm (q (^
v ))

@q (^
v ) @^
v
@^
v @v1
v1 ) :

This expression is positive if and only if m00 (q) =m0 (q) is decreasing in q, i.e., if m (q (v))
is convex. Because v1 is decreasing in p, the publisher’s revenue c M is decreasing in p if
m0 (q) is log-concave.
(2.) It is immediate to see that all results from part (1.) are reversed if m0 (q) is log-convex
(so that m00 (q) =m0 (q) is increasing in q and m (q (v)) is concave in v).
Proof of Proposition 6. (1.) We know from Proposition 1 that advertisers choose the
following targeted set:
A (c; p) =

(

[0; max fc p; 0g] if c < 1=2;
[min fc + p; 1g ; 1] if c 1=2:
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(20)

Thus, under the uniform distribution, the monopoly price of cookies is given by
p (c) =

(

arg maxp [p (c p)]
if c < 1=2;
arg maxp [p (1 c p)] if c 1=2;

and therefore p (c) = (1=2) min fc; 1 cg.
(2.) It follows from (20) that A (c; p (c)) = [0; c=2] if c < 1=2 and A (c; p (c)) = [(1 c) =2; 1]
if c 1=2.
(3.) The single-peakedness of prices p (c), sales (A (c; p (c))), and hence pro…ts, is immediate from parts (1.) and (2.).
Proof of Proposition 7. (1.) For the case of positive targeting, let
p (v; x) =

(v; q ([v; x])) :

(v)

A monopolist data provider chooses the marginal cookie v2 to solve the following problem:
max [p (v; v) (1
v

F (v))] :

The optimal v2 is then given by the solution v to the following …rst-order condition:
p (v; v) f (v) + (1

F (v)) (@p (v; v) =@v + @p (v; v) =@x) = 0:

Conversely, in the symmetric equilibrium with a continuum of sellers, the equilibrium marginal cookie v~2 is given by the solution v to the following condition
p (v; v) f (v) + (1

F (v)) @p (v; v) =@v = 0:

However,
@p (v; v2 )
=
@x

@ (v; q ([v; x])) @q @E [v j v
@q
@v
@x

x]

< 0;

because q (v) is strictly increasing in v, and therefore @ (v; q) =@q > 0 for all q < q (v) :
Therefore, the price under competition p , p (~
v2 ; v~2 ) is higher than the monopoly price
p , p (v2 ; v2 ).
For the case of negative targeting, the monopolist maximizes p (v; v) F (v), where
p (v; x) =

(v)

(v; q ([x; v])) :
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The monopolist’s …rst-order condition is then given by
p (v; v) f (v) + F (v) (@p (v; v) =@v + @p (v; v) =@x) = 0:
In the symmetric equilibrium with a continuum of sellers, the equilibrium marginal cookie
v1 solves the following condition
p (v; v) f (v) + F (v) @p (v; v) =@v = 0:
The solution v~1 is lower (the price is higher) than the monopolist’s threshold v1 since
@p (v; v~1 )
=
@~
v1

@ (v; q ([~
v1 ; v])) @q @E [v j v
@q
@v
@~
v1

v~1 ]

> 0, for all v

E [v j v

v~1 ] :

(2.) We look for a symmetric equilibrium in the price-setting game with n data providers.
Let pj = p2 for all j 6= 1 and characterize the advertisers’demand as a function of (p1 ; p2 ).
If positive targeting is optimal, advertisers buy cookies v 2 [v1 ; v] from seller j = 1 and
v 2 [v2 ; v] from sellers j 6= 1. In particular, the thresholds vj , j = 1; 2; satisfy
(vj )
where

(vj ; q (^
v )) = pj ;

v1 ] + (n 1) E [v j v v2 ]
:
n
Note that p1 > p2 implies v1 > v2 . Now rewrite the pro…t function of seller j = 1 as
v^ (p1 ; p2 ) =

1

E [v j v

= ( (v1 )

(v1 ; q (^
v ))) (1

At a symmetric equilibrium where vj
( (v1 )

(v1 ; q (^
v )))

f (v1 )
=
1 F (v1 )

F (v1 )) :

v, the …rst-order condition of seller 1 is given by
0

@ (v1 ; q (v))
@v1

(v1 )

@^
v dq (^
v ) @ (v1 ; q (v))
:
@v1 d^
v
@q

Both dq (^
v ) =d^
v and @ (v1 ; q (v)) =@q on the right-hand side are positive. Because
@^
v
1 @E [v j v
=
@v1
n
@v

v1 ]

is decreasing in n, the symmetric equilibrium threshold v (n) is increasing in n, and so is
the price p (n).
The analysis under negative targeting yields similar steps and is therefore omitted.
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Proof of Proposition 8. Under positive targeting, the marginal willingness to pay p (v; )
for a targeted set A = [v; v] is given by
p (v; ) ,

(v)

(v; q0 (v; )) ;

where
q0 (v; ) , q ( EF [v 0 j v 0

v] + (1

) EF [v 0 ]) :

The derivative of the inverse demand function with respect to the reach
@p (v; )
=
@

(v

cm0 (q0 (v; ))) q 0 ( ) (EF [v 0 j v 0 < v]

is given by

EF [v 0 ]) :

(21)

The …rst two terms in (21) are positive: pro…ts (v; q0 ) are increasing in q because q0 (v; ) <
q (v); the complete information quantity q ( ) is strictly increasing; and di¤erence of the
conditional and unconditional expected values is negative. Therefore, the marginal willingness to pay p (v; ) is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 9. (1.) Under joint targeting, we know the optimal action on the
residual set is given by q for all k. It follows that the willingness to pay for v is independent
of the distribution. However, as k increases, both Fk (v1 ) and 1 Fk (v2 ) increase, so the
quantity of data demanded increases.
(2.) Consider the inverse demand for data in the case of negative targeting:
p (v1 ) = v1 (q (v1 )

q ([v1 ; v]))

c (m (q (v1 ))

m (q ([v1 ; v]))) :

As k increases, by second-order stochastic dominance, the conditional expectation E [v j v > v1 ]
increases as well. Therefore, q ([v1 ; v]) increases, and because q ([v1 ; v]) > q (v1 ), the willingness to pay p (v1 ) increases as well. Therefore, we know the threshold v1 (p; k) is increasing
in k. If in addition, v1 < E [v], then Fk (v1 ) is increasing in k, and therefore Fk (v1 (p; k)) is
increasing a fortiori. An identical argument applies to the case of positive targeting.
Proof of Proposition 10. Under the conditions of Proposition 3, the monopolist solves
max
p

(p; k) , pFk (E [v]

p
p
2 cp) = pF ( 2 cp= (k)) :

(22)

The …rst-order condition for this problem can be written as
F (x) + xf (x) =2 = 0,
where x :=

p
2 cp= (k). This implies that the optimal p is proportional to
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(k)2 .
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